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CASE COMMENTS
THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO NAVIGABLE WATERS-
COMPENSABILITY UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
Whether a state must grant compensation when it damages or takes
a riparian landowner's right to access to navigable waters when con-
demning property for public use is a question which has been answered
differently in the several states.1
The state of California has a provision similar to the fifth amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States which prohibits the tak-
ing or damaging of private property without just compensation.2 In
Colberg, Incorporated v. State,3 the Supreme Court of California was
recently called upon to determine the right of an individual to com-
pensation for damages done to his right of access by an act of the
state. The case was an action for declaratory judgment sought by
two plaintiff shipyard owners to determine whether they had any
cause of action based on eminent domain against the state for im-
pairment of their right of access to a deep water channel. The two
shipyards were located on a cul-de-sac 5,000 feet up the channel from a
turn basin which gave them their only access to the navigable waters
of the world. At a point between the turning basin and the plaintiffs'
shipyards the state proposed to construct two low-level parallel bridges.
The bridges were to be erected 45 feet above the mean high water
mark. The plaintiffs alleged that 81% and 5% of their respective
established business was with ships in excess of 45 feet in height. Both
plaintiffs alleged damage and loss as a result of this impairment and
alleged a right to compensation. The supreme court, in affirming the
trial court judgment on the pleadings, held that although there may be
a private right as against another private person, such right is burdened
not only with a navigational servitude, but also with a servitude as
extensive as the state's power to" control its navigable waters and is
therefore not compensable when the act is done by the state. 4 In so
holding the court said:
'E.g., Richards v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 77 Conn. 5o1, 6o A. 295 (19o5);
Carmazi v. Board of County Comm'rs, io8 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959); Tomlin
v. Dubuque, B. & M. R.R., 32 Iowa io6 (1871); Stevens v. Paterson & N. R.R.,
34 N.J.L. 532 (Ct. Err. &: App. 187o); Clark v. Peckham, 1o R.I. 35 (1871); See 2
NisOrs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.792 (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
-CAL. CONsr. art. 1, § 14.
3432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967).
'"[W]e hold that such right is burdened with a servitude in favor of the
state which comes into operation when the state properly exercises its power to
control, regulate, and utilize such waters." Id. at 410-11.
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We deem is [sic] unnecessary to decide this question [of private
versus private right], for we have determined that, whatever
the scope of plaintiff's right of riparian access as against other
private persons, that right must yield without compensation to
a proper exercise of the power of the state over its navigable
waters.5
While the states are divided on the rule of right to compensation
for loss of access to navigable waters, the federal rule is well estab-
lished. As first promulgated by the Supreme Court, the federal rule
is that no compensation need be given if there is no physical en-
croachment upon or taking of land and if the governmental act is to
improve navigation.6 The federal immunity is based on the naviga-
tional servitude of any right of access to navigable waters7 and has
been held not to violate the fifth amendment to the Constitution
which provides that private property may not be taken or damaged
by the government without just compensation.8 This navigational
servitude was first construed strictly but has been increasingly ex-
panded by the federal courts. As early as 1945 the Supreme Court in
United States v. Commodore Park, Incorporated9 held that deposit-
ing of sand and silt in a stream which completely blocked a navigable
waterway was an act in aid of navigation. There the government, in
the process of expanding a naval land base in Virginia, dredged a bay
to accomodate sea planes and deposited the silt in a nearby navigable
stream to provide room for land expansion. The district court held
that the act of dredging was to improve navigation but that the act
of depositing silt across a navigable stream was not to aid navigation
and was thus compensable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the entire project was within the federal government's power
over navigable waters. In 196o the Supreme Court held that the con-
struction of a hydroelectric dam which completely blocked a navigable
stream was an act within the navigational servitude.10 The rule has
been so expanded that federal immunity from making compensation
extends to nearly any act so long as there is no physical encroachment
upon the land.
51d. at 406.
OUnited States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, per curiam,
313 U.S. 543 (941); Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (19oo); Gibson v. United
States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897); cf. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S.
222 (1956).
'Cases cited note 6 supra.
'U.S. CONST. amend. V.
0324 U.S. 386 (1945).
1 United States v. Virginia Elec. 9- Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (g6i); see 29 A
C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 115 (1965).
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Nearly all states have provisions similar to the fifth amendment
in their constitutions, 1 but all do not follow the federal rule. While
all states agree that they need not make compensation if the purpose
is to improve navigation, jurisdictions disagree as to whether a private
right of access is superior to a state's right to use waters in behalf
of the public for any other purpose for which it could lawfully devote
any other portion of the public domain.
A majority of states follows the rule that if the work is not to
aid navigation, the riparian landowner may recover for any right
lost or damaged. 12 While the states have not adopted the expansive
interpretations developed in the federal courts, there have been liberal
constructions adopted in two of the majority jurisdictions which limit
the private right and operate in favor of the state. New York and
Massachusetts have held that there is a right of access only to water
adjoining the riparian owner's property.13 Consequently no compensa-
tion is required if the obstruction which limits access to water is not
directly appurtenant to the riparian landowner's property since no
private right has been taken or abridged. Both the New York and
the Massachusetts decisions involved the construction of bridges with
facts nearly identical to those in Colberg. It can be seen then that
the majority rule can be extended to the point of no compensation
as is the case with the federal rule. However, instead of expanding
the navigational servitude immunity, these state courts have con-
stricted the private right and held that the right of access to the
entire stream is a general right held by the public which can be
taken for the good of the public in general.
A minority of states, on the other hand, follows the rule that there
can be no private rights in the public domain and, therefore, that
no compensation is necessary.' 4 These courts hold that the right of
u1See, e.g., ALA. CONsT. art. 12, § 235; ARiz. CONST. art. 2 § 17; ARK. CONST.
art. 2, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 14; COLO. CONST. art. II, 15; GA. CONsT. art. I,
§ 3; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 13; Ky. CONST. § 13; MINN. CONsT. art. 1, § 13; Miss.
CoNsr. art. 3, § 17; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 26; MONT. CONsT. art. III, § 14; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 22; VA. CONST. art. IV, § 58.
2"-E.g., Beidler v. Sanitary Dist., 211 Ill. 628, 71 N.E. ill8 (19o4); Natcher v.
City of Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W.2d 255 (1936); Marine Air Ways, Inc. v.
State, 201 Misc. 349, 1o4 N.Y.S.-d 964 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 28o App.
Div. 1o21, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1952); State ex rel. Anderson v. Masheter,
i Ohio St. 2d 11, 203 N.E.2d 325 (1964); Clark v. Peckham, 1o R.I. 35 (1871);
see 2 NiCHOLs, EaINENT DOMAIN § 5.792 (rev. 3 d ed. 1963).
"sUnited States Gypsum Co. v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 130,
io6 N.E.2d 677 (1952); Marine Air Ways, Inc. v. State, 2o1 Misc. 349, 1o4 N.Y.S.-d
964 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 280 App. Div. 1021, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup.
Ct. 1952).
2"E.g., Lovejoy v. City of Norwalk, 112 Conn. 199, 152 A. 21o (1930); Carmazi
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 1o8 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Ct. App. 1959); Tomlin v.
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access to navigable waters is a public right which is held in trust
by the state and which is contingent upon the state's allowing it to
continue. This is very similar to the liberal construction given to the
majority rule, but a distinction can be made. The minority rule is
saying that, as a matter of law there can never be any private right
of access to public owned navigable waters, while the liberal construct-
ion of the majority rule is that on the facts of a particular case there
is no private right which is superior to the state's power to control or
regulate its navigable waters.
In Colberg the Supreme Court of California went against the great
weight of current authority and aligned itself with the minority
jurisdictions. After stating that any private right must yield to a
proper exercise of the state's power over its navigable waters,'- the
court then examined the extent of the state's power over such waters.
The opinion points out that the federal power over state navigable
waters is limited to navigation and that, therefore, federal immunity
from liability for compensation is limited to acts within that power,
i.e. improvements of navigation. State power, however, is not so
limited. Since the waters and beds of the streams are held in trust
by the state for public use, state power is broader and therefore its
immunity greater. The state has the responsibility not only of im-
proving navigation but also of protecting commerce and fishing. The
court conceded that federal power is paramount but concluded that
state power is more pervasive. If the federal government has not acted
to preempt, state power is plenary. The court also pointed out that
there was federal endorsement of the state action because the Secretary
of the Army and the Chief of Engineers had issued a permit to build
these bridges. 16
The court rejected the plaintiff's comparison with the right of
access to public highways. 17 Under California law a plaintiff would
be entitled to compensation for damage to that right.' s The court
relied on a comparison with an earlier California case in which a
plaintiff was denied compensation for loss of access over tidelands
Dubuque, B. & M. R.R., 32 Iowa lO6 (1871); Frost v. Washington County R.R.,
96 Me. 76, 51 A. 8o6 (igoi); Stevens v. Paterson & N. R.R., 34 N.J.L. 532 (Ct.
Err. : App. 1870); Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash. 236, 26 P. 539 (1891); Milwaukee
Western Fuel Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 152 Wis. 247, 139 N.W. 540 (1913); see
2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.792 (rev. 3d ed. 1963).
'432 P.ad 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 406 (1967).
1
1d. at 404 (but see dissenting opinion at 416-17).
'
7
1d. at 411. For full discussion of compensation for loss of right, of access to
land cases in California see Note, 38 S. Cal. L. Rev. 689 (1965).
81 Bredert v. Southern Pac. Co., 61 Cal. 2d 569, 394 P.2d 719, 39 Cal. Rptr.
903 (1964); Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943).
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which, to improve navigation, were filled in by the city of Newport
Beach, a political sub-division of the state. That case held that
"no such right exists in favor of such littoral owner as against the
state or its grantee in the exercise of a lawful use or purpose."19 The
lawful use to which that court alluded, however, was to improve
navigation. A second case20 relied on by the court may also be dis-
tinguished in the same manner. The only other case2 ' cited by the
court involved a question of assessing damages when compensation is
being given for the condemnation of all the owner's littoral land.
There the question involved the measure of damages, not whether
compensation would be paid.
Colberg seems significant in that California, in denying compensa-
tion, has gone against the greater weight of authority and aligned
itself with a minority of jurisdictions. However, it is suggested that
whatever distinction there once was between the federal, majority
and minority rules, they now appear to be nearly one rule. As noted
earlier, the federal rule has been so liberally construed that nearly any
act involving navigable waters can be contrued as an improvement
of navigation. The majority jurisdictions also seem to be moving
toward a liberal construction in favor of the state by limiting a
private right of access to only the water adjoining a riparian owner's
property.
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of California could
have reached the same conclusion by use of the federal, majority
or minority rule. The court could have followed the federal rule by
considering the promotion of commerce in a shipping area by the
construction of the bridges as an aid to navigation, since more freight
would move on the waterway. The court could have adopted the
liberal construction employed by New York, a majority rule jurisdic-
tion, in Marine Air Ways, Incorporated v. State22 which involved
very similar facts. There the New York court held that a plaintiff who
was partially cut off from a deep channel by a bridge built some
distance from his property had a right of access only to the waters
in front of his property. The California court, instead, followed the
minority rule in finding that, as a matter of law, there is no right in
the public domain and consequently no need for compensation. The
"City of Newport Beach v. Fager, 39 Cal. App. 2d 23, 102 P.2d 438, 441
(1940).
2'Henry Dalton & Sons v. City of Oakland, 168 Cal. 463, 143 P. 721 (1914).
"'People v. Hecker, 179 Cal. App. 2d 823, 4 Cal. Rptr. 334 (196o).
o201 Misc. 349, 104 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Ct. Cl. 1951), aff'd per curiam, 28o App.
Div. 1021, 116 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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